Historical Documents
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Intifada
Plan Dalet (10 March 1948)
The Zionist forces started the war in early April 1948 by
launching Plan Dalet. Plan Dalet was launched to conquer and
ethnically cleanse the country and was not a defence against an Arab
invasion. The Arab armies did not enter Palestine until after the
British left on 15 May. When they entered, it was too late. The
Zionists had already conquered a major part of the country and driven
out most of its inhabitants. Entry of the Arab armies did not make
any difference.
The text that follows is translated from Sefer Toldot Hahaganah
[History of the Haganah], vol. 3, ed, by Yehuda Slutsky
(TelAviv: Zionist Library, 1972), Appendix 48, pp 1955-60.
1. Introduction
(a) The objective of this plan is to gain control of the areas of the
Hebrew state and defend its borders. It also aims at gaining control
of the areas of Jewish settlement and concentration which are located
outside the borders [of the Hebrew state] against regular,
semi-regular, and small forces operating from bases outside or inside
the state.
(b) This plan is based on three previous plans:
1. Plan B, September 1945.
2. The May 1946 Plan.
3. Yehoshua Plan, 1948
(c) Since these plans were designed to deal with the situation inside
the country (the first two plans deal with the first phase of
incidents, while the third plan deals with the possibility of
invasion by regular armies from the neighboring countries), the aim
of Plan D is to fill the gaps in the previous three plans and to make
them more suitable for the situation expected to obtain at the end of
British rule in the country.
2. Basic Assumptions
This plan is based on the following basic assumptions:
(a) The Enemy
1. Expected composition of forces:
The semi-regular forces of the Liberation Army affiliated with the
Arab League, which operate from already occupied bases or bases to be
occupied in the future.
The regular forces of neighboring countries, which will launch an
invasion across the borders, or will operate from bases inside the
country (the Arab Legion ).
Small local forces which operate, or will operate, from bases inside
the country and within the borders of the Hebrew state.
All three forces will be activated at the same time in accordance
with a joint operational plan, and will sometimes engage in tactical
coordination.
2. Actual operations expected from the enemy' .
Isolation and, if possible, occupation of the eastern Galilee,
western Galilee, and the Negev.
Infiltration into the heart of the area of Sharon and Emek Hefer'. in
the direction of Qalqiliyyah-Herzliya and Tulkarm-Netanya,
roughly.
Isolation of the three major cities (especially Tel Aviv). ).
Disruption of food supply lines and other vital services such as
water, electricity, etc.
3. Expected tactical methods:
Attacks by the regular and semi-regular forces on settlements, using
heavy infantry weapons, as well as field artillery, armored vehicles,
and the air force.
Air strikes against centers within our cities (especially Tel
Aviv)
Harassment operations carried out by small forces against
transportation arteries and settlements to give the operations
mentioned above direct or tactical support. These forces will also
carry out sabotage operations against vital economic facilities and
terrorist raids within cities.
(b) The Authorities
This plan rests on the general assumption that during its
implementation, the forces of the [British] authorities will
not be present in the country.
In the event that British forces continue to control certain bases
and areas, the plan must be modified to deal with this situation in
these areas. Additional instructions will be issued in this
regard.
(c) International Forces
This plan rests on the assumption that there will be no
internationalforces stationed in the country which are capable of
effective action,
(d) Operational Objectives
1. Self-defense against invasion by regular or semi-regular forces.
This will be achieved by the following:
A fixed defensive system to preserve our settlements, vital economic
projects, and property, which will enable us to provide governmental
services within the borders of the state (based on defending the
regions of the state on the one hand. and on blocking the main access
routes from enemy territory to the territory of the state. on the
other).
Launching pre-planned counter-attacks on enemy bases and supply lines
in the heart of his territory. whether within the borders of the
country [Palestine] or in neighboring countries.
2. Ensuring freedom of military and economic activity within the
borders of the [Hebrew] state and in Jewish settlements
outside its borders by occupying and controlling important
high-ground positions on a number of transportation arteries.
3. Preventing the enemy from using frontline positions within his
territory which can easily be used for launching attacks. This will
be effected by occupying and controlling them.
4. Applying economic pressure on the enemy by besieging some of his
cities in order to force him to abandon some of his activities in
certain areas of the country.
5. Restricting the capability of the enemy by carrying out limited
operations: occupation and control of certain of his bases in rural
and urban areas within the borders of the state.
6. Controlling government services and property within the borders of
the state and ensuring the supply of essential public services in an
effective manner.
3. Assignment of Duties
In view of the operational objectives outlined above, the various
armed services are assigned the following duties:
(1) Strengthening the fixed defensive system designed to defend the
zones, and coordinating its deployment on the regional level. In
addition, the main enemy access routes to the lands of the state must
be blocked through appropriate operations and measures.
(2) Consolidation of the defensive apparatus.
(3) Deployment in major cities.
(4) Control of the main transportation arteries country-wide.
(5) Encirclement of enemy cities.
(6) Occupation and control of frontline enemy positions.
(7) Counterattacks inside and outside the borders of the country.
(a) The Fixed Defensive System
1.The fixed defensive system in rural areas depends on two main
factors: using protected areas for the purpose of defending the
circumference, on the one hand, and blocking main transportation
routes used by the enemy, on the other hand.
2. The security arrangements pertaining to the zones in rural areas,
originally designed to repel small enemy forces, must be modified in
terms of planning and reinforcement to suit the tactical measures
expected to be employed by semi-regular or regular enemy forces. This
will be effected according to instructions issued by the operations
branch in charge of defense and planning in rural areas.
3. In addition, if we take into consideration the tactical measures
expected to be employed by the enemy, efforts must be made to make a
transition from a positional defense to a regional defense, so that
the unit of defense is the region and not the zone.
4, In order to achieve this objective, the following steps must be
taken:
a) Transformation of the regional staff from an administrative staff
to a general staff (selection of a location, setting up a
communications network, etc.)
b) Formation of a regional mobile reserve, to be recruited from the
forces appointed to the zones, which would reinforce the forces or
carry out counterstrikes in the zones within each region according to
pre-arranged plans.
c) Adaptation and incorporation of the plans concerning fortification
and opening fire in the zones to those of the region, as far as
possible, taking into consideration geographical circumstances and
types of weapons used. These plans must also be coordinated with the
operations of the regional mobile reserves.
5. Settlements which because of their geographical location cannot be
included in a fixed regional defense plan must be organized into
local defense zones. Accordingly, they must be equipped to block
transport roads used by the enemy, or if tactical circumstances
permit, to control the heights, setting up fortifications and
barricades and laying mines, etc. This will be done in addition to
activating the zone's defensive apparatus. Additional forces must be
assigned to carry out these duties, as will be detailed below. These
specifications also apply to isolated regions.
6. Blocking the main enemy transportation routes.
a) The main enemy transportation routes which link his lands to the
lands of the state, such as roads, bridges, main passes, important
crossroads, paths, etc. must be blocked by means of: acts of
sabotage, explosions, series of barricades, mine fields, as well as
by controlling the elevations near roads and taking up positions
there.
b) A system of barricades must be set up in addition to the fixed
defensive system. The tactical plans concerning barricades must be
adapted to and coordinated with the defensive plans concerning the
zones located near these barricades. They must also be coordinated
with the regional defense plans if this is possible from the
geographical point of view.
(b) Consolidation of Defense Systems and Fortifications
The following operations must be carried out if the fixed defensive
system is to be effective and if the rear of this system is to be
protected:
1. Occupation of police stations.
2. Control of government installations and provision of services in
each and every region.
3. Protection of secondary transportation arteries.
4. Mounting operations against enemy population centers located
inside or near our defensive system in order to prevent them from
being used as bases by an active armed force. These operations can be
divided into the following categories:
Destruction of villages (setting fire to, blowing up, and planting
mines in the debris), especially those population centers which are
difficult to control continuously.
Mounting search and control operations according to the following
guidelines: encirclement of the village and conducting a search
inside it. In the event of resistance, the. armed force must be
destroyed and the population must be expelled outside the borders of
the state.
The villages which are emptied in the manner described above must be
included in the fixed defensive system and must be fortified as
necessary.
In the absence of resistance, garrison troops will enter the village
and take up positions in it or in locations which enable complete
tactical control. The officer in command of the unit will confiscate
all weapons, wireless devices, and motor vehicles in the village. In
addition, he will detain all politically suspect individuals. After
consultation with the [Jewish] political authorities, bodies
will be appointed consisting of people from the village to administer
the internal affairs of the village. In every region, a Uewish]
person will be appointed to be responsible for arranging the
political and administrative affairs of all [Arab] villages
and population centers which are occupied within that region.
(c) Deployment in Major Cities
Positions will be taken in the large cities according to the
following principles:
1. Occupation and control of government facilities and property (post
offices, telephone exchanges, railroad stations, police stations,
harbors, etc. )
2. Protection of all vital public services and installations.
3. Occupation and control of all isolated Arab neighborhoods located
between our municipal center and the Arab municipal center,
especially those neighborhoods which control the city's exit and
entry roads. These neighborhoods will be controlled according to the
guidelines set for searching villages. In case of resistance, the
population will be expelled to the area of the Arab municipal
center.
4. Encirclement of the central Arab municipal area and its isolation
from external transportation routes, as well as the termination of
its vital services (water, electricity, fuel, etc.), as far as
possible. ,
(d) Control of Main Transportation Arteries on the Regional Level
1. Occupation and control of locations which overlook main regional
transportation arteries, such as police stations, water pumps, etc.
These elevated locations will be transformed into fortified
surveillance posts to be used, when the need arises, as bases for a
mobile defensive force. (In many cases, this operation will be
coordinated with the occupation of police stations, which aims at
consolidating the fixed defensive system.)
2. Occupation and control of Arab villages which constitute a serious
obstruction on any of the main transportation arteries. Operations
against these villages will be carried out according to the
specifications given under the item pertaining to the searching of
villages.
(e) Enemy Cities Will Be Besieged according to the Following
Guidelines:
1. By isolating them from transportation arteries by laying mines,
blowing up bridges, and a system of fixed ambushes.
2. If necessary, by occupying high points which overlook
transportation arteries leading to enemy cities, and the
fortification of our units in these positions.
3. By disrupting vital services, such as electricity, water, and
fuel, or by using economic resources available to us. or by
sabotage.
4. By launching a naval operation against the cities that can receive
supplies by sea, in order to destroy the vessels carrying the
provisions, as well as by carrying out acts of sabotage against
harbor facilities.
(f) Occupation and Control of Front line Enemy Positions
Generally, the aim of this plan is not an operation of occupation
outside the borders of the Hebrew state. However, concerning enemy
bases lying directly close to the borders which may be used as
springboards for infiltration into the territory of the state, these
must be temporarily occupied and searched for hostiles according to
the above guidelines, and they must then be incorporated into our
defensive system until operations cease.
Bases located in enemy territory which are intended to be temporarily
occupied and controlled will be listed among the operational targets
for the various brigades.
(g) Counterattacks Inside and Outside the Borders of the State
Counterattacks will be used as ancillary measures for the fixed
defensive system in order to abort the organized attacks launched by
semi-regular and regular enemy forces, whether from bases inside the
country or from outside the borders.
Counterattacks will be launched according to the following
guidelines:
1. Diversionary attacks; i.e., while the enemy is launching an attack
against one of our areas, [our forces will launch] a
counterattack deep inside another area controlled by the enemy with
the aim of diverting his forces in the direction of the
counterattack.
2. Striking at transportation and supply routes deep inside enemy
territory, especially against a regular enemy force which is invading
from across the border.
3. Attacking enemy bases in his rear, both inside the country
[Palestine] and across its borders.
4. Counterattacks will generally proceed as follows: a force the size
of a battalion, on average, will carry out a deep infiltration and
will launch concentrated attacks against population centers and enemy
bases with the aim of destroying them along with the enemy force
positioned there;
alternatively, this force may split up to carry out secondary
operations, such as acts of sabotage and diversion on the enemy's
military transportation routes and arteries.
5. A detailed list of counterattacks will be included in the
[list of] operational targets. of the Strategic Mobile Force
[PALMACH].
4. Duties of the Armed Services
(a) Allocation of duties in the fixed defensive system:
1. The following duties are the responsibility of the Garrison Force
[KHIM], defense of the zones and of isolated and fortified
posts and formation of the regional reserves.
2. Within the framework of the fixed defensive system, the Field
Force [KHISH]. are responsible for the following duties:
Operations to block enemy transportation routes. For this
purpose,every blocking operation will be assigned, on the basis of
its importance and type, a specified Field Force unit whose size is
appropriate to the nature of the mission.
In addition, the Field Force brigade in question will be responsible
for duties related to consolidating the fixed defensive system, as
outlined in section 3 (b).
3. In special and exceptional circumstances, Field Force units may be
positioned in the regions or zones, or in isolated and fortified
positions, in order to reinforce zonal or regional defense. Efforts
must be made to decrease the number of such cases, as far as
possible.
4. In addition to the duties detailed above, the Field Force's
responsibilities within the fixed defensive system generally consist
in mounting local counterattacks involving units no smaller than
company (larger units should be used if possible) against enemy units
while they are attacking the fixed defensive system in order to block
their lines of retreat and destroy them. These counterattacks will
usually be launched from fixed operational bases which will be
specified for the Field Force in the context of the duties for which
it is responsible in the region as a whole. These instructions
require that the Field Force units be concentrated as much as
possible, and not be divided up into secondary units.
5. The chain of command in the cases mentioned above will be in
accordance with Addendum 1 to the Order concerning Regional
Infrastructure, November 1947.
6. If the blocking system (which the Field Force is responsible for
defending) is incorporated into the zonal or regional defensive
system, the commander of the Field Force battalion concerned will
appoint the commander in charge of the entire defensive system.
(b) In addition to the duties assigned to the Field Force brigade in
question concerning the consolidation of the fixed defensive system,
the brigade will also carry out the following duties:
Consolidation of positions in the cities.
Control of main transportation arteries country-wide.
Encirclement of enemy cities.
Occupation and control of enemy frontline positions. This will be
effected in accordance with the operational duties assigned to the
various Field Force brigades.
In order to carry out any or all of these duties, the supreme command
can assign units of the Strategic Mobile Force [PALMACH],
which constitute the country-wide reserves, to the Field Force.
2. During the implementation of joint missions with the Field Force,
units of the Strategic Mobile Force [P ALMACH] will fall
under the command of the Field Force brigade that controls the area
in which these units are operating.
3. After completion of the mission, the units of the Strategic Mobile
Force [P ALMACH] will rejoin the country-wide reserves.
4. Efforts must be made to ensure that the period during which units
of the country-wide reserves are assigned to the Field Force is as
short as possible.
(c) 1. The Strategic Mobile Force [PALMACH] is responsible
for carrying out counterattacks inside and outside the borders of the
country.
2. The supreme command may reduce the number of duties assigned to
one or another of the Field Force brigades as it sees fit ( i.e.
those related to the siege of enemy cities, control of transportation
routes and occupation of frontline positions) and allocate them
directly to the Strategic Mobile Force [PALMACH] instead.
(d) The various departments and services of the general staff are
required to complete the above planning orders in their various areas
of responsibility and to present the plans to the Field Force
brigades.
Notes:
1. This is Plan Gimmel or Plan C.
2. This is an early version of Plan D, so called after Yehoshua
Globerman, a Haganah commander killed in early December 1947. Plan D
itself was finalized on 10 March, 1948.
3. This was a British-commanded and financed army of King 'Abdallah's
Transjordan, units of which served in Palestine under British army
orders until the end of the mandate on 15 May 1948. .
4. Sharon is the coastal plain between Haifa and Tel Aviv, Emek Hefer
being its central section (in Arabic Wadi al-Hawarith).
5. The two others are Jerusalem and Haifa.
6. These "police stations" were in fact fortresses, fifty of which
were built by the British throughout Palestine after the Arab
rebellion of 1936-39 in order to control the Arab population.
7. In the original translation, the word `srika' was translated as
"combing." The reference is to a search for hostile forces.
8. This list is not in the Hebrew original of this document.
9. [KHIM ] is short for Khayl Matzav, the second line troops.
By fall 1947, they numbered about 32,000. See Khalidi, From Haven to
Conquest, 862. {Israeli sources give much lower numbers - A.I.)
10. KHISH is short for Khayl Sadeh, the front line troops. By I May
1948, they numbered about 30,000. See Khalidi, From Haven to
Conquest, 861.{Israeli sources give much lower numbers - A.I.)
11. See Appendix C, below (A.I. - Not included in the Web version
).
12. PALMACH is short for Plugot Machats, i.e., crushing battalions.
By spring 1948. this force was made up of three brigades (Yiftach,
Harel, and HaNegev) numbering just above 8,000 men. See Walid
Khalidi, From Haven to Conquest (Washington: Institute for Palestine
Studies, 1987), 861. (The Palmach was originally formed with the
intention of repelling an invasion from Vichy-controlled Syria -
A.I.)
